Africa Briefing N°74

Nairobi/Brussels, 18 May 2010

The growing internal schisms and factionalism within

Somalia’s Islamist movement risk plunging the country

even deeper into violence and bloodshed, with dangerous

implications for the wider region and beyond. These divisions

are also aggravating the political crisis by polarising

groups further along ideological, theological and clan

lines. However, a limited opportunity may now exist for

Somalia’s political actors and the international community

to capitalise on these divisions and re-alignments to

reach out to the increasing numbers of domestic militants

disenchanted with the growing influence of foreign jihadis

and extremist elements bent on pursuing a global agenda.

The divisions have always existed, but remained hidden,

largely because of the unifying factor of Ethiopia’s incountry

military presence since December 2006. The

Ethiopian pullout in early 2009; the formation of a coalition

government led by a prominent Islamist, Sheikh

Sharif Sheikh Ahmed; and the adoption of Sharia (Islamic

law) caught hard-line insurgents and groups, especially

Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahedeen (Al-Shabaab, Mujahidin

Youth Movement), off guard. Thereafter, they had

to justify their existence and continued armed opposition

to the Sharif government. Personality and policy frictions

escalated within the movement, and the gulf widened between

those amenable to some form of a political settlement

and those wedded to al-Qaeda inspired notions of a

permanent global jihad.

The failure of the major offensive by a combined Al-

Shabaab and Hizb al-Islam (Islamic Party) force against

the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in May 2009,

attributable, in large measure, to the decision by the African

Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to mount a

robust defence of the government, catalysed internal dissent

and fragmentation. The insurgents’ mistakes were

their failure to anticipate AMISOM’s reaction and, more

crucially, their misjudgement of the international community’s

resolve to come to the TFG’s defence. The rise

and military gains of a TFG ally, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a

(ASWJ, the Followers of the Prophetic Way and Consensus),

composed of groups opposed to Al-Shabaab’s fundamentalism,

have put significant pressure on the hard-line

insurgency.

Although Al-Shabaab has regained Kismaayo and key

towns and villages in the south by routing its rival (and

erstwhile ally) Hizb al-Islam, it is now on the defensive

and feels beleaguered. The movement is forced to fight

on many fronts and to disperse its assets and combatants

through broad swathes of hostile territory, far from its

Jubba and Shabeelle strongholds in the south. But unless

TFG forces perform significantly better, the balance of

power will not be much altered.

Al-Shabaab’s military troubles have been compounded by

the steady erosion of its popularity and credibility. The

attempt to forcefully homogenise Islam and zealously

enforce a harsh interpretation of Sharia, as well as the

general climate of fear and claustrophobia fostered by an

authoritarian administrative style, has deeply alienated

large segments of society, even in areas once regarded as

solid insurgent territory. Adding to the public disquiet has

been the movement’s increasing radicalisation and the

internal coup that has consolidated the influence of extremists

allied to foreign jihadis. The suicide bomb attack

in Mogadishu in December 2009, in which over two

dozen civilians and officials were killed, caused an unprecedented

public backlash. The widely-held perception

that it was ordered by foreign jihadis prompted high-level

defections and seriously undermined Al-Shabaab’s standing.

Many feel it has irreparably harmed the movement’s

political prospects.

However, Al-Shabaab and Hizb al-Islam are far from spent

forces. They continue to radicalise Somalis at home, in

the region and in the diaspora and remain a threat to the

TFG and neighbouring states. Concern especially for their

links to al-Qaeda extends to the U.S. and other leading

Western states. Consequently, the TFG and its international

partners should:

extremist ideological evolution of the Islamist

movement;

people, including by articulating an argument that the

radicalisation is largely driven by a unique set of

beliefs that are alien to Somalis and an extremist and

literal interpretation of holy texts; and by presenting a

strategy to de-radicalise Somalia’s youth; and

TFG should exploit divisions within Al-Shabaab and

Hizb al-Islam by reaching out to less extreme elements

in both organizations. Bans of those organisations or

their designation as terrorist should not preclude efforts

to talk with and reach understandings with individuals

and factions amenable to political settlement; the international

community should insist the TFG do more in

this endeavour.

Somalis have practised Islam for over 1,000 years. There

have always been many branches of Islam in Somalia,

and the various schools of thought and sects have generally

coexisted peacefully until recently. Most follow a

Shafi’i version of Sunni Islam that incorporates the veneration

of saints, including the ancestors of many Somali

clans, and has traditionally been dominated by apolitical

The emergence of a modern political Islamic consciousness

began to gather momentum in the 1960s, with the

formation of the Wahdat al-Shabaab al-Islamiyya (the

Islamic Youth Union) and the al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (the

Islamic Group), both of which were inspired by Egypt’s

Salafi ideas and the militant undercurrents later

associated with the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. In

Somalia, a particular orientation of Salafism – Wahhabism

– was aggressively promoted by wealthy local and

Gulf groups.

Saudi Arabia – flush with petro-dollars after the oil shocks

of the 1970s – was particularly instrumental in promoting

p. 1. For an in-depth analysis of the origins and evolution of

Toronto, January 2010. The Saudis were motivated by two reasons:

one religious, the other geo-political. The promotion of

Wahhabism is closely tied to the identity of the Kingdom, its

modern history and sense of mission. Wahhabism was also

and Islamic charities sprang up in all the major urban centres

and even in the remote countryside. Thousands of

Somali youngsters were brought to Saudi universities –

principally Medina and Umm al-Qura – to study Wahhabi

parallel with this ambitious educational scheme was

a generous bilateral aid project essentially aimed at weakening

Somalia’s dependence on the Soviet Union and by

Then-President Barre no doubt appreciated this aid but was

increasingly irritated by and wary of the overtly Islamist

group of Saudi-connected clerics who were beginning to

use the pulpit to organise a public campaign against some

of his policies. Matters came to a head in early 1975,

when he forced a confrontation with religious conservatives

as “the conservative shield”, capable of stopping the

march of communism in the Muslim world. Additionally, there

was competition with Egypt and its brand of Sunni orthodox

Islam promoted by al-Azhar University. Equally significant

was the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, with Shiism replacing

communism as the perceived threat. However, Saudi Arabia

has lost much of the control it once had over the powerful

Wahhabi groups it sponsored with the emergence of Salafi jihadi

groups like al-Qaeda. Today it is itself under threat from

the Salafi jihadists.

and 1980s said the scholarship scheme was primarily designed

to create a Somali elite – mainly Islamic teachers and preachers

– whose role was to propagate Wahhabism. The exclusive focus

on Islam, he added, was regrettable, given the crying need

for doctors, engineers, administrators and other professionals.

Crisis Group telephone interview, Cairo, November 2009.

projects and, more crucially, to enable the Somali

government to purchase weapons from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia

and other Eastern Bloc states. The aid was especially critical

for efforts to modernise the army in preparation for the 1977

Ogaden War and arguably emboldened President Barre to defy

Moscow’s warning against attacking Ethiopia. Crisis Group interview,

former senior army general, Nairobi, September 2009.

(“Garyare”), began a discreet campaign to organise Islamist

resistance to Barre. In July 1987, Garyare and his friends

launched the al-Islah (Reform) movement in Saudi Arabia. It

armed opposition groups – the SSDF (Somali Salvation and

Democratic Front) and USC (United Somali Congress). The

alliance broke down after al-Islah failed to dissuade the Somali

rebel groups from getting too close to Ethiopia.

which appear to favour men, needed re-interpreting. Clerics

were outraged by what they regarded as blasphemy. Barre liked

playing to the left-wing gallery and was keen to be seen as a

down followed, during which ten well-known clerics

were executed.

Despite these setbacks, Wahhabism continued to gain adherents

rapidly, and by the early 1980s it was the strongest

defeat of the Somali National Army in the 1977 Ogaden

War with Ethiopia, when the dream of a socialist pan-

Somali state collapsed. More importantly, public confidence

in the ideals of secularism, modernity and progress

were shaken. The collective angst, breakdown of old certainties

and the powerful sense humiliation combined to

create a potent psychological dynamic, conducive for the

Islamist project. In addition, a number of armed groups

stepped up a coordinated military offensive to overthrow

the regime.

The collapse of the Barre regime in 1991, followed immediately

by a bloody internecine clan war, further increased

the appeal of the Islamist project. No less auspicious for

the Islamists in Somalia was the prevailing political mood

in the Muslim world.

Sufi Islam is particularly disliked because of “saint worship”

movements hold similar views, but Wahhabis have been

more energetic in their quest to reform “deviant” sects –

in effect to homogenise Islam. Somali Wahhabism evolved

champion of women’s empowerment. To his credit, he did more

to improve the status of women than any leader, but by questioning

the “fairness” of the Koranic law of inheritance, he was

in effect seeking a confrontation with the conservatives.

meals, clothes, small allowances and, if lucky, scholarships to

study in Saudi Arabia. Saudi charities also funded many orphanages

one of which will go to heaven. Sunan Dawud, vol. 3, Hadith

names or worshipping at their tombs enhances spiritual closeness

of divine powers, a deification, an association of a mortal being

into Salafi jihadism, a highly intolerant and belligerent

jihadi theology and culture that fuels and complicates

of Al-Shabaab have gone to great lengths to desecrate

Islamist ideologues, like Hasan Dahir Aweys, transformed

Wahhabism into a potent revolutionary theology to mobilise

Somalis and effect socio-political change. But there

were numerous reasons why the Islamist groups found

could be harnessed for revolutionary change. Secondly,

it had a strong anti-clerical tendency, something which

Somali Islamist leaders – largely without any formal

theological training – found advantageous. Thirdly, maintaining

Wahhabism meant official and non-official Saudi

funding was guaranteed.

To appropriate Wahhabism for socio-political activism, to

give it an uncompromising militancy and to imbue it with

led to the formation in the early 1980s of al-Ittihaad al-

orientation, fostered ties with like-minded jihadi groups,

seeing itself as part of a global Islamist vanguard aimed at

expanding Islamic control. It developed especially close

links with, and provided support to, Somali insurgent

Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Hassan al-Banna. The two tendencies

have much in common and in many parts of the Muslim

world are increasingly indistinguishable. They share a harsh,

and intolerance of other Muslim sects. Salafi jihadism in Somalia

is a convergence of Wahhabism and modern Salafism. For an

in-depth analysis of Wahhabism and Salafi jihadism, see Crisis

an Italian colonial cemetery by Aden Hashi Farah (“Ayro”) and

his militia in 2005. This then evolved into the more recent

campaign to destroy Sufi shrines.

Muhammad Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab that sought to “cleanse” or

“purify” the Muslim faith from all forms of syncretism, in particular

the influences of Hellenic ideas, Indian and Persian

metaphysics and mysticism. It is thus an attempt to reclaim and

maintain a perceived “purity” of the Islamic faith against Sufi

world, especially North Africa, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and

Afghanistan. See ibid.

Al-Ittihaad’s defeat did not diminish the powerful hold

Salafi Jihadism had over Islamist radicals in Somalia. If

anything, it intensified the process of radicalisation and

may – a number of observers believe – have pushed some

The core Takfiri doctrine contends that the modern day

This is an elevation of the Salafi doctrine which

(pre-Islamic age of ignorance). Takfiri ideas have a long

pedigree in Somalia and remained a dormant sub-strand

within the larger body of the Salafi jihadi ideology of

the beginning of 2009, a fanatical fringe of the Salafist

jihadis have revived and instrumentalised Takfiri ideas in

its ideological war with Sheikh Sharif and his government.

They regard these ideas as a “purifying” progression

– as the next theological rung in the Salafi jihadi

ideological ladder – and divide the world into two simple

(the Islamic Union of Western Somalia) and the Ogaden National

Liberation Front. In 1995-1996, al-Ittihaad was involved in terrorist

attacks in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa. Ibid, pp. 4-9.

crossed the border into Somalia to attack and destroy al-Ittihaad

bases. Ibid, p. 9.

February 2010. Al-Shabaab Emir, Ahmed Abdi Godane, is now

believed to be the prominent local Somali exponent of Takfiri

jihadism. Takfiri ideas have a long pedigree and can be traced

to the Khawarij, a fanatical group that emerged in the seventh

century and waged a bitter campaign against the fourth Muslim

leadership of Shukri Mustafa, a member of the Muslim Brothers

who acquired his revolutionary views through exposure to

Sayyid Qutb’s writings and his own experience of detention in

for the kidnapping and murder of a former government minister.

Shukri Mustafa was subsequently executed but militants

inspired by Takfiri ideas, including Osama bin Laden’s deputy,

Ayman al-Zawahiri, have been associated with extremist violence

ever since. For a fuller description, see Crisis Group Middle

In Takfirism, the correct existential role and vocation of

the “true believer” is to wage permanent jihad to recreate

of the Islamic faith, as recognised by mainstream Sunni

are mortal sins and proof of apostasy, punishable by

death. In the eyes of the Takfiris, Sharif and the TFG are

guilty of these sins.

Although many variations of Islam remain in Somalia,

currently the struggle is largely between Salafi groups,

principally Al-Shabaab and Hizb al-Islam, and traditional

Sufi groups, organised under the umbrella of Ahlu Sunnah

groups was linked to the belief that they could transcend

the schisms that have so divided Somali society, but

despite a gloss of unity, most Islamist groups are equally

Shabaab and Hizb al-Islam shared a similar vision and

issues, pan-Somali nationalism and the political utility of

clans. ASWJ is much more tolerant of ideological differences,

Building even a modestly coherent profile of Somalia’s

Islamist groups remains a great challenge, because there

is no primary written material on policy, ideology and

divisions, they remain highly secretive. One consequence

is the over-emphasis on personalities. Inevitably, not enough

Sunni scholars to distinguish themselves from the Shia branch

of Islam. By implication they suggest that Wahabbis, especially

Al-Shabaab, are not part of Islam’s four orthodox schools.

common in all Hizb al-Islam and Al-Shabaab-controlled areas.

face-veil.

and given its close ties with Ethiopia, will – like many

other groups – want to keep its position ambivalent.

Ittihaad al-Islami and the Union of Islamic Courts – generally

tended to avoid discussions on theological and ideological differences.

It was thought they would divide the Islamist movement,

inflame sectarian tensions and sap its political and military

strength. However, the reality is that there was always a

strong undercurrent of homogenisation – to impose the puritanical

Wahhabi brand of Islam across the country.

attention has been paid to the ideas, motives and theology

which animate these groups and fuel their uniquely uncompromising

brand of politics. But an understanding of

the core ideological and theological elements shaping that

intransigence and which are at the root of the current infighting

is critical for the peace process. Any serious initiative

by the TFG to reach out to the insurgency and draw

up a list of possible interlocutors will have to be based on

One area of division is Somali nationalism. Hizb al-Islam’s

two traditional leaders, Sheikh Hasan Dahir Aweys and

Sheikh Hasan Abdullahi Hirsi, “Hasan Turki”, are nationalists

and strong advocates of the creation of a greater

Somalia, which incorporates all the Somali-inhabited

much broader than the Somali-inhabited regions of the

Horn of Africa. It aspires to creating a new global Islamic

Hard-liners in the organisation see nationalism as a legacy

of colonialism and part of the problem. They argue

that modern nationalism and the idea of a nation-state are

Islamic community).

The other difference is views about clans. Hizb al-Islam

also takes a pragmatic view of the clan system, which it

tries to exploit to achieve its strategic aims. The four

main Hizb al-Islam affiliates were chosen with a view to

and Turki have in the past enjoyed cordial relations with

elders from their clans – the Ayr and the Ogaden, respectively.

Their seniority in age and political longevity has

allowed them to build a good rapport with clan elders and

thus access to clan support. In fact, the decision by the

clans in Mogadishu and in southern Somalia to back the

Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in their struggle against

the warlords in 2006 and its decisive victory were precisely

due to the Courts’ ability to engage with clan eld-

will not – in and of itself – help to produce a clearer image.

These groups are evolving and mutating in a fluid political

environment in which alliances are constantly shifting. See Crisis

Kenya; most people in Djibouti (former French Somaliland) are

also Somali.

– a name that evokes the memory of the Islamic empire that

controlled southern Spain (Andalusia), a period considered by

many as Islam’s golden era.

from the major clans included Dr Omar Iman Abubakar (Baadi-

Cadde); Mohammed Mire (Majerten); Hasan Mahdi (Reer Aw-

Hasan); Abdiqadir Komandos (Gaadsan, Dir); and Abdullahi

Khatab (Reer Aw-Hasan).

ers. In the heady days when the Courts enjoyed near universal

support, Aweys and his colleagues were not only

viewed as credible national leaders, but more significantly,

Views on the clan system within Al-Shabaab are mixed.

The hardliners are ideologically opposed to it and see any

manifestation of “clan bias” as proof of insufficient

commitment to Islam. Less extreme figures sometimes

manipulate the clan system to mobilise and achieve shortterm

objectives but are equally uneasy about getting sucked

into Somalia’s clan politics.

Al-Shabaab (the Youth) grew to prominence during the

the UIC, it energetically conducted an extensive

military, political and propaganda campaign aimed at recapturing

southern Somalia. It has largely recruited from

radicalised young men and sees the struggle with its adversaries

of Islamist groups opposed to Ethiopian occupation, it has

become over the last couple of years more centralised and

increasingly extremist. There are two main reasons, one

political, the other ideological.

up approach”, although, in the UIC days, it appeared that

was the general direction in which things were evolving. Mogadishu

was governed as a city state (Banaadir), and that administrative

model and success was to be replicated elsewhere. That

should not be confused with regionalism. Islamists of all stripes

generally dislike the concept as a recipe for further fragmentation.

Even moderates in Sharif’s camp are reluctant federalists,

which explains the hostility of Puntland towards the Sharif TFG.

One is that it was created in 1998 by Islamist leader Hassan

Dahir Aweys as a crack military unit of the Islamic Courts. The

other is that it was created in mid-2006 by an Aweys protégé,

Ayro, as part of a special unit of the courts militia to carry out

“dirty war” and later to spearhead the insurgency against the

Ethiopian and Somali government forces.

techniques. Various Somali jihadi websites, mainly hosted in

Europe and North America, promote its militant ideology, which

sees “pure” Muslims as being in a permanent state of war with

“infidels”. It also tries to popularise the “culture of martyrdom”.

CDs and video tapes are distributed showing young men

reading out their last testaments and conducting suicide operations

and clerics extolling the virtues of jihad and martyrdom.

The Al-Shabaab web-site, Kataaib.net, is adorned with pictures

of young “martyrs” who have died in suicide operations.

The dramatic changes in the political landscape in early

2009 triggered a series of shock waves that jolted Al-

Shabaab to the core. An Islamist leader, Sheikh Sharif

Sheikh Ahmed, was elected the new president of an expanded

TFG – briefly renamed Government of National

Unity – on 31 January. Ethiopia’s phased troop withdrawal

that began in December 2008 ended in early February

2009. The new government shortly thereafter declared its

commitment to codify and implement Sharia. Discreet

back-channel negotiations got underway to convince key

Al-Shabaab leaders to abandon the armed struggle and

join the government.

The speed, scale and potential implications of the changes

threw Al-Shabaab and the other insurgent groups momentarily

off balance, sending them scrambling for an effective

response. Their well-rehearsed discourse and rhetoric,

largely pegged on what they were opposed to and

waging the armed struggle for, appeared to ring hollow, if

not altogether disingenuous to many Somalis. They were

now expected to articulate what they stood for, and more

importantly, in what way their project to Islamise the

country was better or different from that of the new TFG.

When it came, Al-Shabaab’s response was overwhelmingly

negative and stridently adversarial. Sharif was a traitor.

His Islamist credentials were dubious and his intentions

a tool to dismember the Islamist movement. AMISOM

was not a peacekeeping or neutral force but the continuation

of the Ethiopian occupation by another name.

Islamist fraud and his moderate Islamism as not authentic began

immediately after the collapse of the UIC in January 2006.

It gathered momentum during the Djibouti process. At the superficial

level, it was an attempt to discredit his