[image: J. Peter Pham]
Strategic Interests
by J. Peter Pham Ph.D.
World Defense Review olumnist
Muddled on Mogadishu: America's Confused Somalia Strategy
Amid rumors that the otherwise moribund "Transitional Federal Government"
(TFG) of Somalia might just bestir itself enough to attempt to break out of
the tiny enclave in Mogadishu which Islamists insurgents have kept it and
its supporters from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) boxed,
there is reason to be concerned that in this geopolitically critical corner
of the world the United States and other governments have substituted
wishful thinking for realistic assessment and muddled platitudes for policy
objectives, thereby magnifying the potential damage when, as I warned
earlier this year <http://worlddefensereview.com/pham011410.shtml>, this
improvised approach falls apart.
Four points to consider:
First, the virtual entirety of the international community's Somali
strategy—if the hodgepodge of policies can even be dignified with that
name—has been predicated on an assumption about Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's
accession to the TFG presidency last year that has now been exposed as a
false premise. As Bronwyn Bruton succinctly summarized in her recent Council
on Foreign Relations Special Report *Somalia: A New
Approach*<http://www.cfr.org/publication/21421>(for which I had the
privilege of being a member of the advisory committee):
*In the months immediately following Sheikh Sharif's election, there was
widespread optimism that the TFG would draw radical factions into the peace
process—but those hopes rapidly proved illusory. Although Sheikh Sharif has
attempted to create an Islamist identity for the TFG by promising to adopt
sharia, he has been rejected as a Western proxy by the principal Islamist
factions in Somalia. The TFG has also failed to generate a visible
constituency of clan or business supporters in Mogadishu. Its survival now
depends wholly on the presence of AMISOM forces, which further reinforces
the perception that the TFG is a foreign implant.*
Readers of this column will not be surprised by this. A fortnight after
Sharif Ahmed's "election" by an *ersatz* assembly that could not even
convene inside Somali territory and which, as the TFG legislature, has not
met again for nearly a year for want of a quorum, I warned
here<http://worlddefensereview.com/pham021209.shtml>that while an
unexpectedly turnaround could not be ruled out
*a priori*, it was highly unlikely that anyone—much less someone with as
checkered a past as Sharif Ahmed—could prevent the whole transitional
framework from unraveling. The fact that, one year after its "makeover," the
TFG still has yet to even establish a mere presence in—much less control
over—a majority of Mogadishu's sixteen districts is a sobering reminder of
its limitations. As the director of one Somali nongovernmental organization
told me last year, *"Muhammad the prophet could be in charge and the result
would be the same."*
Second, the very notion of a unitary national government could succeed given
the overall dynamics of the ongoing devolution of Somalia demonstrates
nothing so much as the wholesale ignorance of its proponents, both with
respect to Somali culture and history and Somali political developments over
the last two decades. Events over the course of the last year confirm the
trend. As I noted last year <http://worlddefensereview.com/pham071609.shtml>,
the inhabitants of the northwestern region of Somaliland remains committed
to their quest for recognition of the independent state they had before
joining with the former Italian colony of Somalia in a 1960 union that they
regretted for the ensuing three decades. Elections, expected later this
year, will only consolidate this effective schism as all three political
parties contesting the polls agree on the independence of Somaliland from
the former Somali Democratic Republic. The northeastern region of Puntland
was, when I last examined the
subject<http://worlddefensereview.com/pham092409.shtml>,
still committed to being a part of a future federal Somalia, although its
people reserved their right to negotiate the precise terms of any union.
Since then, despite the fact that a fellow Darood/Harti clansman, Omar
Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, is the designated "prime minister" of the TFG, in
recent months Puntlanders have edged closer to formally abandoning the
scuttled (and apparently sinking) Somali ship of state. In late December,
the regional parliament voted unanimously to adopt a distinctive flag
(hitherto the flag of Somalia had been used), coat of arms, and anthem.
All of this means that Somali policies which are wedded to reestablishing a
centralized government around the TFG are irrelevant. Consider just the raw
demographic data. Of the estimated 9 million Somalis in the world, more than
one million of them are refugees or permanently living in the diaspora,
about 3 million live in Somaliland, and another 2.4 million in Puntland.
Thus TFG and its struggles with the Islamists—whether of the *Harakat
al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen* ("Movement of Warrior Youth," al-Shabaab) or
the *Hisbul
Islam* ("Islamic party") factions—really only affect at most less than
one-third of the total Somali population, all of whom live in the southern
and central Somalia. This area accounts for about only one-third of the
territory of the Somali state before its collapse in 1991. If the United
States and the international community are interested in stability in the
Horn of Africa—and they should be given the links between Islamists there
and those in Yemen, especially al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)—then
what is needed is something more comprehensive than the affirmation made by
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson in a special
briefing on Somali policy two weeks
ago<http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2010/138314.htm>that
*"U.S. policy in Somalia is guided by our support for the Djibouti peace
process,"* a process that ignores two-thirds of the relevant geopolitical
space and most of its effective authorities.
In point of fact, about the only Somalis who have been interested in signing
up for a centralized Somali government are those who have some ulterior
motive, usually pecuniary, to gain by the allegiance—which only lasts as
long as the relationship continues to be lucrative. Take the case of the
deal struck last week by the TFG with some leaders of the *Ahlu Sunna
wal-Jama'a* (roughly, "[Followers of] the Traditions and Consensus [of the
Prophet Muhammad]") militias which have opposed al-Shabaab and its allies in
the central regions of Somalia. The ASWJ leadership will "join" the TFG
insofar as they get to appoint five ministers, one minister of state, five
deputy ministers, ten directors general, three ambassadors, twelve other
diplomats, and the deputy commanders of the army, national police, and
security agency. While the deal signing was duly witnessed by the Ethiopian
foreign minister, the chairperson of the African Union Commission, and the
special representative of the United Nations secretary-general, the accord
is not quite what it was spun as. For one thing, while ASWJ has several
thousand members, they are—notwithstanding Ethiopian efforts to train them
professionally and equip them properly—largely just clansmen mustered on an
*ad hoc* basis, rather than a standing force that could be incorporated into
the TFG's armed forces. For another, the TFG's ministries are virtual
entities, so the political nominations are nothing more than licenses to
steal the money that outside donors throw at the regime—recall that two of
the "ministers" killed by the December 2009 suicide bombing of the Shamo
Hotel in Mogadishu, "Minister of Higher Education" Ibrahim Hassan Adow and
"Minister of Education" Ahmed Abdullahi Wayel, held overlapping portfolios
which were all the more redundant considering that neither of them actually
ran any schools, while two of the "ministers" wounded, "Minister of Tourism"
Mohamed Hussein Said and "Minister of Sports" Saleban Olad Roble, hold
titles which are almost black humor given the grim reality of Somali life.
In fact, the deal has already been repudiated by a number of ASWJ
leaders—including its number two, Sheikh Hassan Sheikh Abdi—who apparently
weren't given their due in the division of spoils.
Nor will the addition of additional African peacekeepers—according to a report
in the U.S. Armed Forces newspaper *Star and
Stripes*<http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=68833>,
some additional 1,700 Ugandan troops were flown into Mogadishu last week by
American contractor DynCorp—alter this dynamic. In fact, even with the
reinforcements, it is beyond delusional to think that such a modest
contingent of Africans can succeed where the infinitely more robust UNITAF
and UNOSOM II forces, with their 37,000 and 28,000 troops respectively,
including at one point more than 25,000 U.S. personnel, failed in the 1990s
against a less capable foe than the Islamist insurgents opposing the TFG.
Third, even if it was an effective government—and it isn't (more on this
below)—there is little evidence that Sharif Ahmed's regime is a desirable
partner in the least. While professing moderation during his many
peregrinations abroad, the TFG head promotes, as *The Economist* pointed out
last year, *"a version of* sharia *law whereby every citizen of Somalia is
born a Muslim and anyone who converts to another religion is guilty of
apostasy, which is punishable by death."* Contrast this with the situation
in Somaliland, a largely democratic, if struggling, polity where Islamic
jurisprudence is just one source of legal norms, alongside civil legislation
and customary Somali law (*xeer*), or in Puntland where, notwithstanding its
other difficulties, religious extremism is resisted.
Sharif Ahmed does not even have the good manners to keep his noxious
ideology at home, but with an almost reckless disregard to the fact that his
very continued existence is owed to the good will of the international
community, he has chosen to rub America's nose in it. In November, the TFG
appointed Omar Jamal, a Minneapolis Somali advocate, to the post of first
secretary at the Permanent Mission of the Somalia at the United Nations in
New York. The new job comes just in time for its new incumbent—who has been
dubbed *"the Al Sharpton of the Twin Cities' Somali community"*—since it
includes diplomatic immunity that will likely stay his deportation (a
federal jury convicted him in 2005 of lying to immigration officials and he
has exhausted his appeals). Then in February, Sheikh Sharif appointed as his
"special envoy to the United States of America" one Abukar Abdou Arman, a
former president of the Columbus, Ohio, chapter of the Council on
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). While Arman regularly posts on the
*Huffington
Post*—before his elevation he had floated a proposal
there<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/abukar-arman/a-new-paradigm-for-engagi_b_406363.html>to
*"offer confidence-building amnesty to key individual players who are on the
US terrorist list, as these lists further radicalize people"* as well as
screeds<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/abukar-arman/the-muffled-screams-of-ga_b_422371.html>accusing
Israel of being
*"devoid of any conscience"* and comparing Israeli leaders to *"Pharaoh and
Hitler"*—he doesn't seem to be as concerned about the free speech of those
who disagree with him, earning at one point a public rebuke from the *Columbus
Dispatch*<http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/editorials/stories/2008/10/04/CAIR.ART_ART_10-04-08_A10_4NBGBOL.html>for
his
*"effort to suppress the discussion ... by labeling it as bigotry and
hatemongering."* Lovely. Perhaps those who would hold the TFG *capo* up as a
partner might want to consider what these two nominations say about what he
really is.
Fourth, one might even hold one's nose and engage with an unsavory partner
if the latter were at least effective. Alas, "effective" is not a term which
can be used alongside the TFG, support to which is more likely to have the
reverse consequence from what is intended. In his briefing, Ambassador
Carson acknowledged that the United States has *"provided limited military
support to the Transitional Federal Government."* Other countries, including
a number of our European Union allies, have provided training and equipment
to the TFG's forces. Unfortunately, the United Nations Monitoring Group on
Somalia recently delivered a scathing report to the Security
Council<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/246/89/PDF/N1024689.pdf?OpenElement>on
all the good that this assistance has been. The UN analysts' findings
are
tantamount to an indictment not just of the TFG, but of any policy that
relies on that outfit:
*The military stalemate is less a reflection of opposition strength than of
the weakness of the Transitional Federal Government. Despite infusions of
foreign training and assistance, government security forces remain
ineffective, disorganized and corrupt — a composite of independent militias
loyal to senior government officials and military officers who profit from
the business of war and resist their integration under a single command.
During the course of the mandate, government forces mounted only one notable
offensive and immediately fell back from all the positions they managed to
seize. The government owes its survival to the small African Union peace
support operation, AMISOM, rather than to its own troops ... *
*The security sector as a whole lacks structure, organization and a
functional chain of command—a problem that an international assessment of
the security sector attributes to "lack of political commitment by leaders
within the Transitional Federal Government or because of poor common command
and control procedures" ... To date, the Transitional Federal Government has
never managed to deploy regimental or brigade-sized units on the
battlefield.*
*The consequences of these deficiencies include an inability of the security
forces of the Transitional Federal Government to take and hold ground, and
very poor public perceptions of their performance by the Somali public. As a
result, they have made few durable military gains during the course of the
mandate, and the front line has remained, in at least one location, only 500
meters from the presidency.*
As the UN Monitoring Group exhaustively documented, about the only thing the
members of the TFG do well—aside from losing battles—is to engage in
criminal activity. The UN investigators confirmed what I first reported here
last fall <http://worlddefensereview.com/pham091709.shtml>, that a large
proportion, if not the majority, of U.S. military assistance to the TFG,
including some 94 tons of infantry weapons and ammunition to date, simply
ends up being sold on the open market. Moreover, it seems that TFG officials
have extended their corruption from simple misappropriation of resources to
the far more dangerous realm of visa fraud:
*Visa fraud involving Transitional Federal Government officials and members
of parliament is among the most brazen. Politicians claim that they need to
travel on official business, such as an invitation to address a diaspora
group or attend a conference, accompanied by a bogus delegation of
government officials (and occasionally family members). Such requests are
typically accompanied by a note verbale or other introductory document from
the Somali Embassy, often with a supporting letter from a minister, the
Speaker of Parliament or one of his deputies. If the request meets with
approval, the other members of the delegation pay as much as $15,000 each
for the opportunity to travel. Many do not return ... *
*Monitoring Group investigations have linked a number of senior officials of
the Transitional Federal Government to the practice of visa fraud, including
the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Fisheries, Abdirahman Ibrahim Adan
Ibbi, the Minister for Women's Affairs and Gender, Fowsiya Mohamed Sheikh,
and the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Madoobe Nunow Mohamed. The
Constitutional Minister is a repeat offender: in April and June 2009 he
organized delegations to attend a constitutional training workshop in
Germany convened by a prestigious institution, as part of the
UNDP-coordinated constitution-building activities in Somalia. The
delegations included members of the Independent Federal Constitutional
Commission, private individuals masquerading as ministry officials, and
relatives of the Minister. At least eight of these individuals, including
Nunow's son, subsequently "disappeared". With the exception of his
relatives, the Monitoring Group has learned that those who did not return
paid the Minister $14,000 per visa. Subsequently, five of the individuals
claimed political asylum in the Netherlands. Nunow has since submitted
similar requests to other European embassies in Nairobi.*
*One of the most prominent "brokers" is a Somali member of parliament and
former member of the African Union Parliament named Abdiaziz Abdullahi
Mohamed "Abdi-hukun". A Kenyan resident since 1997 and Somali member of
parliament since 2004, Abdiaziz possesses an African Union passport, despite
having lost his seat in the African Union Parliament more than five years
ago, as well as a Swedish travel document. Together with another Swedish
Somali resident, formerly based in Kismaayo with Al-Shabaab, Abdiaziz
facilitates the movement through Kenya of Somali diaspora youth seeking to
join Somali armed opposition groups. *
*In April 2009, Abdiaziz requested visas from the Italian Embassy for two
members of his family. The visas were issued and the men travelled to Milan,
but subsequently left Italy with fraudulent papers for a third country.
Monitoring Group investigations offer grounds to believe that both men were
in fact members of an armed opposition group—allegedly Al-Shabaab.*
These allegations are especially worrisome when one couples them with the
evidence produced by the Monitoring Group that Al-Shabaab—which,
incidentally, achieved recognition earlier this month as a "proscribed
organization" under the Terrorism Act by the British
government<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2010/uksi_20100611_en_1>and as
a
"listed terrorist group" by the Canadian
government<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/media/nr/2010/nr20100307-eng.aspx?rss=false>,
in addition to terrorist designations previously made by the United States
and Australia—and Hisbul Islam as well as Somali pirates have exploited
these connections to facilitate the travel of members to Western countries.
Given both the increasing internationalization of al-Shabaab as well as the
group's recent public acknowledgement of an alliance with al-Qaeda, one
cannot afford to ignore the threat posed by the TFG's criminal disregard for
the security of the members of the international community.
Given this reality, it should come as no surprise that the approach taken by
the United States and other countries with respect to Somalia is more than a
tad bit schizophrenic. While the media is wont to describe the TFG—which, it
should be recalled, is just the fifteenth in a succession of failed interim
regimes since the overthrow of the dictatorship of Muhammad Siyad Barre—as
the "internationally recognized government" of Somalia, the fact is its
legal recognition as a sovereign subject of international law is more the
exception than the rule. While the United States, for example, never
formally severed relations with Somalia after shutting down the American
Embassy there in 1991, neither has it officially recognized any of the
fifteen transitional governments, including the current TFG. The State
Department website merely states <http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/so/>: *"The
United States maintains regular dialogue with the TFG and other key
stakeholders in Somalia through the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya."* In
fact, the lack of affirmative *de jure* recognition for the TFG is presumed
by the introduction in October 2009 of a proposed Congressional
Resolution<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.RES.859:>by
Congressman Donald Payne, chairman of the Africa Subcommittee of the
U.S.
House of Representatives, urging *"the Obama Administration to recognize the
TFG and allow the opening of an official Somali Embassy in Washington."* The
clear implication is that the United States Government accords the TFG
something less than normal diplomatic recognition as a sovereign. In fact,
this point was formally conceded in early 2010 by the Obama administration
when, in a brief filed with the U.S. Supreme
Court<http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/09-10/08-1555_AffirmanceAmCuUSA.pdf>in
a case involving Siyad Barre's defense minister, Mohamed Ali Samantar,
the Solicitor-General of the United States and the Legal Advisor of the
State Department acknowledged that *"since the fall of that government, the
United States has not recognized any entity as the government of
Somalia"*(full disclosure: Professors Lee Cassanelli of the University
of Pennsylvania, Ioan M. Lewis of the London School of Economics, Gérard
Prunier of the University of Paris, and Hussein Bulhan of the University of
Hargeisa filed a joint brief as amici curiae http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/09-10/08-1555_RespondentAmCuSomaliExperts.pdf>in
support of Samantar's victims).
The approach taken by the United States is in line with that taken by other
nations. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office's website
states<http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-profile/sub-saharan-africa/somalia?profile=intRelations>:
"Since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 there have been no formal
diplomatic links between the UK and Somalia." And the TFG's former "foreign
